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ABSTRACT 
It’s been a long-standing assumption that Irish manufacturing firms are price takers in 
their output markets. This assumption has been validated by several aggregate level 
studies. While a much smaller number of studies have examined this issue at a more 
disaggregated level, they tend to support this conclusion. All of these studies also assume 
that firms are price takers in their input markets, or, in other words inputs are perfectly 
elastically supplied to firms. This assumption, however, has never been formally tested. 
There is intrinsic interest in the context of competition law in ascertaining evidence of 
deviations from perfect competition in sales of product and purchases of inputs. Moreover 
the introduction of minimum wages provides an important additional motivation for the 
topic of this paper, since it is well known that the introduction of minimum wages or 
increases in the level of minimum wages can lead to increases in employment over a certain 
range of wages if the firm possesses market power in its labour market. By using four-digit 
level Census of Industrial Production (CIP) panel data the paper sets out to test the extent 
of potential market power in Irish manufacturing industries. The paper employs the 
ingenious method proposed by Hall and later modified by Roeger in this exercise. While 
the Hall-Roeger method was originally concerned with imperfect competition in output 
markets, it can be readily extended to input markets. The empirical results do not indicate 
much evidence of significant imperfect competition in output markets but the results do 
point to evidence of market power in certain input markets and in some industrial sectors. 
The implications of these findings are discussed. 
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TESTS OF MARKET POWER IN IRISH MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper applies a test for market power, originally proposed by Hall (1988) and subsequently 
modified by Roeger (1995), to Irish manufacturing industries using the Census of Industrial 
Production (CIP) database for the period 1991 to 1999. Both Hall and Roeger were interested in 
monopoly power but their approach can be easily extended to the case of monopsony power as 
demonstrated in an interesting application to the US tobacco industry by Raper, Love and 
Shumway (1998). Apart from the intrinsic interest in the context of competition law in 
ascertaining evidence of deviations from perfect competition in sales of product and purchases of 
inputs, the introduction of minimum wages provides an important additional motivation for the 
topic of this paper. It is well known that the sectoral employment response to the introduction of 
a minimum wage will not be negative and may well be positive if the sector is characteristic by 
monopsonistic-type behaviour in the labour market (see for example, Boyle, McCarthy and 
O’Neill (1998)). 
 
A succession of papers have demonstrated convincingly that price-taking behaviour is a 
reasonable assumption as far as output markets are concerned for the Irish manufacturing sector 
as a whole. A smaller number of papers have verified the validity of this assumption for 
particular sectors of manufacturing industry (see, for example, Callan and FitzGerald (1998)). To 
the best of our knowledge no paper, however, has looked at whether firms are price takers in 
their input markets. A further aim of this paper is to attempt to fill this gap. 
 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 outlines the test procedure while Section 3 
discusses the database employed in the empirical analysis and presents a number of econometric 
tests for the presence of imperfect competition in output and input markets. Section 4 concludes 
the paper. 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank Denis Conniffee, Donal O’Neill and Maurice Roche, together with colleagues at a 
departmental seminar, for comments on an earlier draft.  
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2. Tests of Market Power – the Hall and Roeger Approach   
 
Hall (1988) sets out a new test for monopoly power in U.S. industry. He rejects the traditional 
conjectural variations’ approach2 to testing for market power, as being overly dependent in its 
execution on specific functional form assumptions, in favour of a non-structural reduced-form 
approach. His basic but powerful insight is that the traditional Solow residual (SR) should be 
independent of variations in the log-change of output in the absence of monopoly power.  
 
Suppose we have a constant-returns two-input production function. Equation (1) interprets the 
traditional Solow residual as the sum of (unobservable) productivity shocks (A) and Hicks-
neutral technical change (). 
 
 AxxsxySR )()( 12*21        (1) 
 
where, 
 
y  = (log) gross output, 
x’s = (log) inputs, 
*
2s   = cost share of input x2 in the value of output, 
A = (log) productivity shock, 
     = (log) Hicks-neutral technical change. 
 
To illustrate how the Hall test for monopoly power works we first define the Lerner coefficient 
(mp) of monopoly power as 
 
mp
mc
mcp            (2) 
 
where, 
 3
p = output price 
mc = marginal production cost 
 
The ‘true’ cost share ( ) under competitive pricing may be written *2s
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Substituting this expression for  in (1) we can obtain two equivalent interpretations*2s
3 of the 
Solow residual. First we have 
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 1)(1)()( 11221    (3) 
 
and secondly we get 
 
  AxxsxxsxySR mp )()()( 1221221    (3)(a) 
 
The addition of an error term to equations (3) and (3)(a), which also incorporates the 
unobservable productivity variable A, allows the Lerner coefficient mp to be estimated using 
econometric methods. 
 
Raper, Love and Shumway (1998) demonstrate that Hall’s approach can easily be extended to 
the monopsony case. In the case of monopsony, the Lerner coefficient becomes 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2 For a relatively recent application in this genre see Schroeter (1988) and for an overview of 
some other approaches to testing for market power see, for example, Massey (2000) 
3 I would like to thank Denis Conniffe for drawing my attention to this point which is not made by Hall or indeed, to 
the best of my knowledge, by any other author in the relevant literature. 
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If purchases of say x2 in equation (1) were subject to monopsonistic power then the cost share 
term becomes s2(1+ms). Incorporating this expression for  in (1) provides the following 
equation for the Solow residual 
*
2s
 
  AxxsxxsxySR ms )()()( 1221221    (5) 
 
Again the addition of an error term to (5) that incorporates the unobservable productivity 
variable, allows ms to be estimated using regression analysis. 
 
An important implication of (5) is that it is seen to be identical to (3)(a). Thus for the two-input 
case it is clear that it is impossible by using Hall’s methodology to discriminate between 
monopolistic and monopsonistic sources of imperfect competition. Hall acknowledges as much 
when he suggests that a possible explanation for his estimate of a relatively large and statistically 
significant Lerner coefficient, that is obtained by estimating an equation like (3), could be 
monopsonistic-type behaviour. Thus at best it is misleading to refer to tests such as (3) or (5) as 
tests of “monopoly” or “monopsony” power.  
 
A more general specification would be to allow for both monopoly and monopsony sources of 
market power and to test for either or both sources using appropriate restrictions. Suppose then 
that we permitted (1) to be afflicted by both monopoly and monopsony. With this more general 
specification equation (2)(a) becomes    
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Substituting (6) for in (1) we could obtain expressions that are identical to equations (3) and 
(5) except that the coefficient to be estimated is the product of the monopoly and monopsony 
Lerner coefficients. A third formulation can also be easily derived as 
*
2s
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At first glance, it would appear possible to use (7) to simultaneously test for imperfect 
competition in both output and input prices. However, on closer inspection the right-hand-side 
variables are seen to be nearly perfectly collinear.  
 
Hall acknowledges that the econometric estimation of equations (3), (5) or indeed (7) is 
problematic because of the inherent correlation between the right-hand-side variable and the 
error term which it will be recalled includes inter alia the term, A. In principle instrumental 
variable estimation can be employed but it will be difficult to obtain suitable instruments with 
the desirable statistical properties. 
 
Roeger’s (1995) contribution stems from this concern with Hall’s otherwise ingenious method. 
 
Roeger first of all points out that the Solow residual can be equivalently obtained from the cost 
function which is of course the dual of the production function. Denoting the residual in this 
instance by SRP, its value is given by  
 
 AwwswpSRP )()( 12*21      (8) 
 
Roeger’s basic contribution is to note that apart from a random error term that captures 
measurement error, the difference between the quantity and price-based Solow residuals should 
vanish under the null hypothesis of perfect competition in product and input markets. Thus we 
have 
 
0)]()[()]()[( 1122
*
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If product markets were, however, characterised by monopoly behaviour then replacing  in (9) 
by the expression in (2)(a), the following equation provides an econometric test
*
2s
4 
 

  )]()[(1 11 wxpySRPSR mp
mp
     (10) 
where, 
 = random error term. 
 
The great advantage of Roeger’s approach is of course that since  can be interpreted to only 
capture measurement error there is no reason to suppose that the right-hand-side variable will be 
correlated with it, implying the OLS will yield a consistent estimate of . mp. 
 
Similarly, if monopsony behaviour applies to purchases of, for instance, input x2, then an 
econometric test for its presence is given by equation (11) 
 
  )]()[( 11222 wxwxsSRPSR ms      (11) 
 
A further practical advantage and attractive feature of Roeger’s approach worth noting is that 
expenditure data are typically more readily available than quantity information, especially in 
regard to capital stock data.  
 
However, our observations on the Hall method concerning the difficulty of discriminating 
between monopolistic and monopsonistic sources of imperfect competition apply equally to 
Roeger’s method. Thus estimation of (10) or (11) will provide essentially the same information 
on the extent of departures from perfect competition. Estimation of equations of the form of (11), 
however, provide us with a somewhat non-rigorous, if less than comprehensive, means of 
discriminating between monopolistic and monopsonistic sources of imperfect competition. If we 
allow for a firm to exercise potential market power in both output and in up to M-1 input 
markets, we substitute an expression of the form (6) in (9) to yield 
                                                          
4 This is the dual counterpart to equation (3). We can also derive an expression similar to equation 3(a). 
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 or, writing (12) using simpler notation  
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The equation in (13) implies that the non-rejection of a test for equality of the js would strongly 
suggest market power in the setting of output prices whereas rejection of equality of the js 
would provide reasonably strong support for a monopsony basis for departures from imperfect 
competition. The test is of course predicated on the presumption that equality of the monopsony-
based Lerner coefficients for all M-1 inputs is a highly unlikely prospect. 
 
 
 
3. Applying Roeger’s Method to Irish Census of Production Data 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The Irish Census of Production (CIP) database as published by the Central Statistics Office 
(CSO) is employed to test for the presence of potential market power in the majority of 
manufacturing industry sectors. For each year the full dataset provides information on some 138 
four-digit industrial sectors. For each year data are available on the nominal value of each 
sector’s gross output together with each sector’s expenditure on “Materials”, “Services”, “Fuel 
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and Power”, “Industrial Employment” and “Other Employment”. Under the assumption of CRS, 
capital costs are implicitly given as “the remainder of net output”. At the commencement of this 
study we had access to nine years of such data from 1991 to 1999.  
 
The dataset allowed us to form a panel. In forming the panel we had to ensure that the same four-
digit sector aggregates were available each year. As we also wanted to generate separate sets of 
market-power coefficient estimates at the two-digit level, we also confined the analysis to those 
two-digit sectors for which we had a sufficient panel of data points to conduct a separate 
regression analysis for each two-digit sector. These considerations resulted in 109 four-digit 
level observations across 17 two-digit sectors being available for each year. As we lose one 
year’s data due to the regression variables being defined in terms of log changes, the total 
number of observations in the panel is 8x109= 872 for the period 1992 to 1999.   
 
In Table 1 we furnish the list of two-digit sectors for which market-power coefficients were 
estimated together with selected characteristics of these sectors. Our chosen sectors account for 
nearly 84% of both total manufacturing employment and “Wages and Salaries” expenses. The 
“Food” sector (code 15) stands out as the single-largest industrial sector in our analysis. It is seen 
to account for nearly 20% of total manufacturing employment and “Wages and Salaries” and 
around a quarter of total “Materials” and “Services” expenses. Sector 24 (“Chemicals”) also 
stands out as a sector of significance. It is clearly a capital-intensive sector and accounts for 
nearly 40% of “Capital” expenses for all manufacturing industries. For about six5 of these 
sectors at least half of the gross output is produced by foreign-owned firms and over half6 of the 
sectors export at least 60% of the output that is produced. 
                                                          
5 Sectors 17-18, 22, 24, 31-33 and 34-35.  
6 Sectors 15, 17-18, 22, 24, 25, 28, 31-33, 34-35 and 36-37. 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of the sectors employed in the estimation of the Lerner coefficients for Irish 
manufacturing industries (1999) 
Sectors Manufact. 
Employ. 
Wages and 
Salaries 
Expenses 
Materials 
Expenses    
Service      
Expenses 
Fuel and 
Power 
Expenses 
“Capital”a   
Expenses 
 Per cent of total manufacturing 
15 
Food 
18.71 18.25 23.85 17.51 27.29 14.50 
17 
Textiles 
2.40 1.82 0.71 0.61 1.64 0.27 
18 
Wearing Apparel 
2.27 1.53 0.55 0.72 0.79 0.33 
20 
Wood & Wood 
Prods. 
2.27 1.82 1.22 1.64 3.57 0.46 
21 
Pulp & Paper 
1.91 2.12 1.00 1.15 1.78 0.60 
22 
Printing & Rec. 
Media 
7.79 9.10 3.24 7.12 2.78 16.65 
24 
Chemicals 
9.23 11.86 10.62 18.44 15.91 39.05 
25 
Rubber & Plastic 
4.24 3.72 1.83 2.46 4.05 0.82 
26 
Other Non-
Metallic 
4.20 4.59 1.54 4.89 10.25 1.29 
28 
Fabricated 
Metals 
5.24 4.65 2.03 3.71 2.89 0.84 
29 
Machinery & 
Equipment 
5.82 5.37 2.44 2.05 2.76 1.26 
31 
Electrical 
Machinery 
5.85 5.23 2.71 6.64 2.18 1.44 
32 
Radio, TV & 
Comm. Equip. 
5.36 5.85 7.15 10.85 5.93 6.87 
33 
Med., Prec. & 
Opt. Instrum.  
6.27 5.24 2.65 1.34 2.70 2.37 
34 
Motor Vehicles 
1.65 1.47 0.99 0.73 0.70 0.22 
35 
Other Trans. 
Equip. 
2.20 2.73 0.66 3.86 1.03 0.32 
36 
Furniture 
4.32 3.62 2.91 1.65 2.30 1.05 
All (%) 83.46 83.73 63.45 84.03 85.85 85.97 
a: “Remainder of net output”. 
Source: Derived from the Census of Industrial Production (1999), Irish Central Statistics Office 
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In Table 2 we document the output shares of the major expense items for each of the two-digit 
sectors. With the exception of sector 24(“Chemicals”) by far the dominant expense item is 
“Materials” followed by “Capital” then “Wages and Salaries”. 
Table 2 
Output shares(%) of the major expense items of the sectors employed in the estimation of 
the Market-Power coefficients for Irish manufacturing industries (1999) 
Sector “Materials” “Services
” 
“Fuel and 
Power” 
“Wages 
and 
Salaries” 
“Capital”a Total 
15 
Food 
51.6 1.4 1.2 7.6 38.1 100.0 
17 
Textiles 
49.1 1.6 2.4 24.2 22.8 100.0 
18 
Wearing 
Apparel 
42.5 2.1 1.3 22.8 31.3 100.0 
20 
Wood & 
Wood Prods. 
53.8 2.7 3.3 15.5 24.7 100.0 
21 
Pulp & Paper
45.2 1.9 1.7 18.5 32.7 100.0 
22 
Printing & 
Rec. Media 
12.7 1.0 0.2 6.8 79.2 100.0 
24 
Chemicals 
17.3 1.1 0.5 3.7 77.3 100.0 
25 
Rubber & 
Plastic 
49.2 2.5 2.3 19.3 26.8 100.0 
26 
Other Non-
Metallic 
35.1 4.1 4.9 20.2 35.7 100.0 
28 
Fabricated 
Metals 
49.0 3.3 1.5 21.7 24.6 100.0 
29 
Machinery & 
Equipment 
47.5 1.5 1.1 20.1 29.8 100.0 
31 
Electrical 
Machinery 
47.2 4.3 0.8 17.5 30.3 100.0 
32 
Radio, TV & 
Comm. Equip. 
41.7 2.3 0.7 6.6 48.7 100.0 
33 
Med., Prec. & 
Opt. Instrum.  
36.6 18.6 9.3 18.9 16.6 100.0 
34 
Motor 
Vehicles 
62.6 1.7 0.9 18.0 16.7 100.0 
35 
Other Trans. 
Equip. 
37.8 8.2 1.2 30.4 22.3 100.0 
36 
Furniture 
58.3 1.22 1.0 14.0 25.5 100.0 
a: “Remainder of net output”. 
Source: Derived from the Census of Industrial Production (1999), Irish Central Statistics Office 
3.2 Regression analysis and results 
 
Our basic regression equation is  
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We also exploit the panel nature of the data to test for differences in the market-power 
coefficients across our 17 two-digit sectors by estimating an equation of the form 
 
  
 

1
1 22
)(
N
i
M
j
ijijNj
M
j
j Dzzy        (15) 
 
where,  has the usual interpretation as the difference between the market-power coefficient 
value for the nth two-digit sector and the ith two-digit sector and D is a dummy variable that takes 
a value of 1 if the observation falls into the ith two-digit sector and zero otherwise.  
 
The market-power coefficients for each two-digit sector are thus generated as  
 
ijjij             (15)(a) 
with associated standard errors. 
 
3.2.1 Results assuming constant slopes across the two-digit sectors 
 
Estimation of equation (14) using OLS yielded the results given in Table 3. We report an 2R of 
0.37, which is a reasonable fit for these kind of data and a statistically insignificant first-order 
autocorrelation statistic.  
 
As to the coefficient estimates, it would appear that statistical evidence of imperfect competition 
exists for three of the inputs, namely, “Materials”, “Services” and “Industrial Employment”. 
Also we strongly reject the null hypothesis of equality of the market-power coefficients which 
provides support for the hypothesis that the source of market power lies in the pricing of the 
inputs to manufacturing industry and not in the pricing of outputs. 
 
The market-power coefficient is estimated at under 1% for “Materials” but at 2.5% for 
“Industrial employment”. It is particularly interesting that we get a highly significant negative 
value for “Services” which is also of a substantial magnitude at nearly 9%. The negative value 
implies that industries are paying substantially more for “Services” than the internal marginal 
value of these inputs to industries. 
 
To put these coefficient estimates in perspective, the exercise of market power in 1999 cost 
suppliers about €146 m. and €200 m. for “Materials” and “Industrial Employment” respectively. 
As against this, our estimates suggest that suppliers of “Services” were able to squeeze about 
€100 m. out of the manufacturing sector in 1999. 
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Table 3 
OLS market-power coefficienta estimates for Irish manufacturing industries, 1991-1999; 
assuming common coefficients across manufacturing industry sectors 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
  1   2   3   4   5 2R  LM
b 
0.00658 
(0.00277)ss 
-0.087792 
(0.01880)ss 
-0.00348 
(0.02345) 
0.00907 
(0.01234) 
0.02513 
(0.00628)ss 
0.37 -0.14 
(0.91) 
Key:   = materials;  = services;  = fuel and power;  = “other” employment;  = industrial employment. 1 2 3 4 5
a: The likelihood ratio test for equality of the market power coefficients produced a value of 178 with 1 dof which 
substantially exceeds the critical 2 value with 1 dof.  
b: LM denotes the Lagrange Multiplier test for first-order autocorrelation which is obtained by regressing the 
residuals from the equation on its lagged value and the other right-hand-side variables. The values reported here are 
the estimated coefficient and standard error respectively obtained for the lagged residual term. 
ss: denotes statistically significant at the 95% level. 
 
 
3.2.2 Results allowing for variable slopes by two-digit sector 
 
Equation (15) allows the market-power parameter values to vary across each of the 17 two-digit 
sectors. It was also estimated using OLS and yielded an 
2
R  value of 0.56 and an LM-
autocorrelation value of 0.17 with a standard error of 0.91. We note that with these estimates we 
again reject the null hypothesis of equality of the market-power coefficients for each input which 
provides support for the hypothesis that the source of market power lies in imperfect competition 
in the pricing of inputs. 
 
The market-power coefficient estimates for each of the 17 two-digit sectors were generated using 
equation (15)(a) and the results are tabulated in Table 4. The hypothesis of equality of the 
market-power coefficients across the 17 two-digit sectors is strongly rejected with a value of 395 
(80 dof) for the likelihood-ratio test. 
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Table 4 
OLS market-power coefficient estimates for Irish manufacturing industries, 1991-
1999;allowing for differenta coefficients across the two-digit manufacturing industry 
sectors (standard errors in parentheses)b 
Sector   1   2   3   4   5
15 
Food 
0.00594 
(0.00170)ss 
-0.04653 
(0.02328)ss 
-0.06143 
(0.02896)ss 
0.01429 
(0.01705) 
0.01513 
(0.01135) 
17 
Textiles 
0.00977 
(0.00485)ss 
-0.19169 
(0.06714)ss 
-0.12100 
(0.05080)ss 
0.09952 
(0.04091)ss 
0.03376 
(0.01877)s 
18 
Wearing 
Apparel 
0.01459 
(0.00835)s 
-0.03562 
(0.02812) 
0.02176 
(0.05781) 
0.01277 
(0.04979) 
-0.00278 
(0.01661) 
20 
Wood & Wood 
Prods. 
0.00161 
(0.00101)s 
-0.06959 
(0.01796)ss 
-0.01355 
(0.02010) 
0.01375 
(0.01121) 
0.01542 
(0.00725)ss 
21 
Pulp & Paper 
0.00482 
(0.00107)ss 
-0.00308 
(0.01431) 
-0.02844 
(0.01860)s 
-0.02798 
(0.01191)ss 
0.00845 
(0.00437)ss 
22 
Printing & 
Rec. Media 
-0.00114 
(0.00148) 
-0.01027 
(0.01037) 
0.03162 
(0.03340) 
-0.00725 
(0.00436)s 
0.00204 
(0.00327) 
24 
Chemicals 
0.01570 
(0.00582)ss 
-0.12557 
(0.06223)ss 
-0.04208 
(0.04110) 
-0.03576 
(0.02620) 
0.00387 
(0.04843) 
25 
Rubber & 
Plastic 
0.00147 
(0.00046)ss 
-0.00569 
(0.00415) 
-0.00064 
(0.00992) 
-0.00261 
(0.00449) 
0.00636 
(0.00478) 
26 
Other Non-
Metallic 
0.00610 
(0.00164)ss 
-0.13159 
(0.01586)ss 
-0.01852 
(0.00842)ss 
-0.02314 
(0.00696)ss 
0.01643 
(0.00647)ss 
28 
Fabricated 
Metals 
0.00061 
(0.00290) 
-0.13855 
(0.04015)ss 
-0.09456 
(0.10183) 
0.04652 
(0.02988) 
0.05304 
(0.03321)s 
29 
Machinery & 
Equipment 
0.00250 
(0.00066)ss 
-0.03583 
(0.00923)ss 
-0.01316 
(0.01781) 
0.00298 
(0.00499) 
0.00449 
(0.00184) 
31 
Electrical 
Machinery 
0.00305 
(0.00174)s 
-0.04810 
(0.02429)ss 
0.03076 
(0.04200) 
0.01913 
(0.01813) 
-0.00201 
(0.00515) 
32 
Radio, TV & 
Comm. Equip. 
0.00558 
(0.00084)ss 
-0.07581 
(0.02776)ss 
0.11843 
(0.11915) 
0.00547 
(0.01126) 
-0.00818 
(0.00917) 
33 
Med., Prec. & 
Opt. Instrum.  
-0.00326 
(0.00151)ss 
-0.18827 
(0.02709)ss 
-0.05551 
(0.04242) 
0.02005 
(0.01372)s 
0.00656 
(0.00834) 
34 
Motor Vehicles 
-0.00037 
(0.00120) 
-0.03870 
(0.01295)ss 
-0.03356 
(0.02949) 
-0.00137 
(0.01950) 
0.01965 
(0.00195)ss 
35 
Other Trans. 
Equip. 
-0.01242 
(0.02359) 
-0.00767 
(0.06643) 
0.29141 
(0.30646) 
-0.12878 
(0.09011) 
0.05059 
(0.03282)s 
36 
Furniture 
0.01500 
(0.00824)ss 
0.02829 
(0.06373) 
0.03571 
(0.15236) 
0.03421 
(0.05399) 
0.02290 
(0.03717) 
Key:   = materials;  = services;  = fuel and power;  = “other” employment;  = industrial employment. 1 2 3 4 5
a: The likelihood ratio test for equality of the market power coefficients produced a value of 365 with 1 dof which 
substantially exceeds the critical 2 value with 1 dof.  
b: 
2R = 0.56; LM = 0.12 (SE = 0.93); LM denotes the Lagrange Multiplier test for first-order autocorrelation which 
is obtained by regressing the residuals from the equation on its lagged value and the other right-hand-side variables. 
The values reported here are the estimated coefficient and standard error respectively obtained for the lagged 
residual term. 
s: denotes statistically significant at the 90% level. 
ss: denotes statistically significant at the 95% level. 
 
 
Consistent with our findings in Table 3, we find a preponderance of significant market-power 
coefficient estimates for the “Materials” (13 sectors) and “Services” (11 sectors) inputs. About 
seven sectors report statistically significant values for “Industrial Employment” with five and 
four sectors returning statistically significant values for “Other Employment” and “Fuel and 
Power” respectively. 
 
About eight sectors report a market-power coefficient for “Materials” that is greater than or equal 
to 0.5% (sectors 15, 17, 18, 21, 24, 26, 32 and 36). The surprisingly negative and large market-
power coefficient that was obtained for “Services” in Table 3 is replicated for virtually every 
sector in Table 4. About seven sectors report a market-power coefficient for “Services” that is 
greater than or equal to –5% (sectors 17, 20, 24, 26, 28, 32 and 33). Around eight sectors (sectors 
15, 17, 20, 26, 28, 34, 35 and 36) return an estimated market-power coefficient in respect of 
“Industrial Employment” that exceeds or equals 1%. 
 
Three sectors stand out as having especially large and statistically significant market-power 
coefficients in respect of “Materials”, “Services” and “Industrial Employment”, namely, sectors 
17 (“Textiles”), 24 (“Chemicals”) and 28 (“Fabricated Metals”). 
 
3.2.3 Some robustness checks: influential observations 
 
Our results so far suggest the prevalence of market power in the pricing of production inputs in a 
large number of Irish manufacturing sectors. Given the importance of these findings it is 
important that our results are subject to a series of robustness’ checks. Our first set of tests is 
motivated by the concern that our OLS estimates may be unduly influenced by outlier 
observations. The possibility of outliers is prompted by the very nature of the methodology 
employed to generate the results in Tables 3 and 4. If the hypothesis of perfect competition in 
output and input prices holds for a large number of observations then according to equation (9) 
the dependent variable takes on the value of zero. Where imperfect competition holds then (9) 
takes on non-zero values. It is possible therefore that those observations which have non-zero 
values for the dependent variable will unduly influence the regression results. 
 
We employed two approaches to assess the impact of exceptional observations. First, we 
performed OLS on a truncated dataset which excluded outlier observations according to the 
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criterion proposed by Belsey, Kuh and Welsch (1980)7. In Table 5 we report the estimates of 
market power that were obtained on the assumption of constant two-digit sector slopes. About 90 
of the 872 observations were deemed to be “influential” according to the Belsey-Kuh-Welsch 
test. These results should be compared directly with those given in Table 3. These estimates 
serve to highlight the qualitative impact of influential observations on the magnitude of the 
market-power coefficients. 
 
Table 5 
OLS market-power coefficient estimates for Irish manufacturing industries, 1991-
1999;assuming common coefficients across manufacturing industry sectors but excluding 
influential observations (standard errors in parentheses) 
  1   2   3   4   5 2R  
0.00244 
(0.00034)ss 
-0.04685 
(0.00347)ss 
-0.02905 
(0.00760)ss 
0.00116 
(0.00285) 
0.00665 
(0.00155)ss 
0.27 
Key:   = materials;  = services;  = fuel and power;  = “other” employment;  = industrial employment. 1 2 3 4
                                                          
5
ss: denotes statistically significant at the 95% level. 
 
The most obvious difference between the estimates in Table 5 and Table 3 is the substantial 
reduction in the magnitude of the market power coefficients for “Materials” (down by about 
60%), “Services” (down by about 50%) and “Industrial Employment” (down by about 75%) and 
the substantial increase in the size of the “Fuel and Power” coefficient which, unlike Table 3, is 
now statistically significant. Overall the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in 
Table 3 and the parameters, with the exception of the coefficient for “Other Employment”, are 
highly significant8.  
 
A second estimation approach that can handle the problem of influential observations is the 
employment of the Least Absolute Difference or LAD estimator9.(see Judge et al (1998)) The 
estimator minimises the impact of outliers by fitting the regression line through the median of the 
data rather than the mean in the case of OLS.  
 
The LAD estimates, incorporating the assumption of constant two-digit sector slopes, are 
exhibited in Table 6.  
 
Table 6 
7 I would like to acknowledge my colleague, Maurice Roche’s, suggestion to use this approach. The procedure 
resulted in about 90 observations being discarded out of the total of 872. 
8 We also ran the model of variable-slope coefficients on the truncated sample and obtained results of a similar 
nature. 
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9 I would like to acknowledge my colleague, Donal O’Neill’s, suggestion to use this estimator. 
 
Least Absolute Distance market-power coefficient estimates for Irish manufacturing 
industries, 1991-1999;assuming common coefficients across manufacturing industry sectors 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
  1   2   3   4   5 2R  
0.00217 
(0.00026)ss 
-0.02666 
(0.00198)ss 
-0.00578 
(0.00430) 
-0.00422 
(0.00201)ss 
0.00500 
(0.00095)ss 
0.32 
Key:   = materials;  = services;  = fuel and power;  = “other” employment;  = industrial employment. 1 2 3 4 5
ss: denotes statistically significant at the 95% level. 
 
These results are qualitatively very similar to those reported in Table 5 where we truncated the 
sample to exclude outliers. Relative to the OLS estimates for the complete sample in Table 3, we 
note that the market-power coefficients in respect of “Materials” and “Services” are about 70% 
lower in absolute magnitude while the coefficient for “Industrial Employment” is around 80% 
lower. The coefficient value for “Other Employment” is not too dissimilar as between the LAD 
and OLS estimates for the complete sample and is, in any case, also statistically insignificant.   
 
In Table 7 we present the estimated market power coefficients generated by the LAD estimator 
but now allowing the slope coefficients to vary by two-digit sector.  
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Table 7 
LAD market-power coefficient estimates for Irish manufacturing industries, 1991-
1999;allowing for different coefficients across the two-digit manufacturing industry sectors 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Sector  1    2   3   4   5
15 
Food 
0.0016552 
(0.00075)ss 
-0.011826 
(0.01042) 
-0.024165 
(0.02347) 
-0.0030469 
(0.00950)  
0.0084302 
(0.00623) 
17 
Textiles 
0.0053564 
(0.00127)ss 
-0.065583 
(0.01103)ss 
-0.035388 
(0.01359)ss
0.016506 
(0.01844) 
0.003349 
(0.00433) 
18 
Wearing 
Apparel 
0.014926 
(0.00173)ss 
-0.047181 
(0.01092)ss 
0.068821 
(0.01690)ss
-0.051582 
(0.01485)ss
-0.0029508 
(0.00421) 
20 
Wood & 
Wood 
Prods. 
0.0015771 
(0.00410) 
-0.043917 
(0.01589)ss 
-0.0002383 
(0.03255) 
0.000263 
(0.02368) 
0.009374 
(0.00983) 
21 
Pulp & 
Paper 
0.0040965 
(0.00116)ss 
0.0001882 
(0.02268) 
-0.019234 
(0.033691) 
-0.015521 
(0.00966)s 
0.0032912 
-0.0069 
22 
Printing & 
Rec. Media 
0.0004376 
(0.00308) 
-0.0062446 
(0.01914) 
0.0020526 
(0.06693) 
-0.004496 
(0.00468) 
0.0016521 
(0.00322) 
24 
Chemicals
0.0023853 
(0.00113)ss 
-0.033041 
(0.00943)ss 
0.0038951 
(0.01007) 
-0.002727 
(0.00857) 
-0.0044804 
(0.00860) 
25 
Rubber & 
Plastic 
0.0014602 
(0.00227) 
-0.0079353 
(0.02279) 
0.000846 
(0.05596) 
0.002638 
(0.01800) 
-0.0010146 
(0.01258) 
26 
Other Non-
Metallic 
0.004832 
(0.00111)ss 
-0.059132 
(0.00411)ss 
-0.01114 
(0.00707)s 
-0.011089 
(0.00565)ss
0.0054426 
(0.00413) 
28 
Fabricated 
Metals 
0.0018641 
(0.00081)ss 
-0.032149 
(0.00561)ss 
-0.0056407 
(0.02017) 
0.0035323 
(0.00760) 
0.0044513 
(0.00455) 
29 
Machinery 
& 
Equipment
0.0014987 
(0.00111) 
-0.014513 
(0.01291) 
-0.0063647 
(0.03917) 
0.0006608 
(0.00956) 
0.00000 
(0.00404) 
31 
Electrical 
Machinery
0.0016192 
(0.00109)s 
-0.017278 
(0.01037)s 
0.016068 
(0.03639) 
0.0010228 
(0.00937) 
0.000941 
(0.00506) 
32 
Radio, TV 
& Comm. 
Equip. 
0.0038342 
(0.00092)ss 
-0.061462 
(0.03073)ss 
0.023516 
(0.12890) 
0.017355 
(0.01102)s 
-0.0026887 
(0.01097) 
33 
Med., Prec. 
& Opt. 
Instrum.  
-0.0060158 
(0.00333)s 
-0.20872 
(0.03080)ss 
-0.1153 
(0.09407) 
0.038914 
(0.02731) 
0.02051 
(0.01683) 
34 
Motor 
Vehicles 
-0.0011962 
(0.00228) 
-0.023278 
(0.01552)s 
-0.042503 
(0.05921) 
0.017655 
(0.03136) 
0.018413 
(0.00472)ss 
35 
Other 
Trans. 
Equip. 
0.0024885 
(0.00086)ss 
-0.037978 
(0.00463)ss 
0.050381 
(0.02249) 
-0.064264 
(0.00787)ss
0.020924 
(0.00284)ss 
36 
Furniture 
0.0040022 
('0.00213)s 
0.0005567 
(0.01524) 
-0.024547 
(0.04561) 
-0.0057968 
(0.01696) 
-0.0014583 
(0.00819) 
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Key:   = materials;  = services;  = fuel and power;  = “other” employment;  = industrial employment. 1 2 3 4 5
2R = 0.28. 
s: denotes statistically significant at the 90% level. 
ss: denotes statistically significant at the 95% level. 
 
If we contrast these results to those reported in Table 4 for the complete-sample OLS estimates, 
we note that the LAD estimates essentially reduce the magnitude of those coefficients that would 
appear to be outliers in the OLS set of estimates. Thus we find a reasonably close 
correspondence between the estimates for “Materials” with the exception of sectors 34 (“Motor 
Vehicles ”), 35 (“Other Transport  Equipment”) and 36 (“Furniture”). For “Services”, we 
observe that the predominance of negatively-signed coefficients is replicated but there is a much 
lower concordance in the two sets of estimates, although there is a notable tendency for the LAD 
estimates to be systematically lower than the OLS estimates. The coefficients for “Industrial 
Employment” are qualitatively very similar to the OLS estimates, although we can now only 
report statistically significant coefficients for sectors 34 (“Motor Vehicles ”) and 35 (“Other 
Transport  Equipment ”). The OLS estimates produce coefficients of substantially greater 
magnitude for sectors 17 (“Textiles”), 28 (“Fabricated Metals ”), 35 (“Other Transport  
Equipment ”) and 36 (“Furniture ”).  
 
As an illustration of the nature and scale of the differences obtained between the LAD and OLS 
estimates for the complete sample we depict the coefficients obtained for both estimators in the 
case of “Industrial Employment” in Chart 110. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Essentially similar pictures are obtained for the other inputs. 
Chart 1 
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3.2.4 Robustness checks: economies of scale 
 
We have not alluded so far to the possibility that the findings of imperfect competition could be 
at best contaminated by, or, at worst be mistaken for, scale effects. Our reluctance to confront 
this conundrum so far is because of the huge difficulty in satisfactorily distinguishing empirically 
between imperfect competition and scale effects with the Hall-Roeger methodology. Kee (2002) 
shows that it is in principle possible to derive an expression for the difference between the Solow 
quantity and price-based residuals which is a function of a market power and a scale term. Thus 
by modifying equation (13) as follows 
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where, S is the actual sum of input shares which may differ from unity and k =1,…, M, it would 
appear possible to simultaneously test from departures from competitive pricing and constant 
returns to scale. Unfortunately, equation (16) is non-estimable due to perfect collinearity between 
the right-hand-side variables as will be apparent upon examination of equation (10)11. 
 
The best we believe that can be done is to add a scale term to the specification in equations (14) 
or (15) which will not be perfectly collinear with the market-power term. Thus we re-ran 
equation (14) using the LAD estimator and added the log-change in the value of gross output 
(p+y) as an additional right-hand-side variable. The results are given in Table 8. It is apparent 
that the inclusion of the output term does not affect the magnitude of the market-power 
coefficients and is itself not statistically significant. However, it has to be noted that this equation 
will also suffer from multicollinearity so we cannot be emphatic about the apparent non-
importance of scale terms12. 
 
Table 8 
LAD market-power coefficient estimates for Irish manufacturing industries, 1991-
1999;assuming common coefficients across manufacturing industry sectors and including a 
scale term (standard errors in parentheses) 
  1   2   3   4   5 (p+y  2R  
0.002159 
(0.00027)ss 
0.027246 
(0.001985)ss 
-0.005548 
(0.004386) 
-0.00461 
(0.002029)ss 
0.005131 
(0.00095)ss 
0.000042 
(0.00014) 
0.32 
Key:   = materials;  = services;  = fuel and power;  = “other” employment;  = industrial employment. 1 2 3
                                                          
4 5
ss: denotes statistically significant at the 95% level. 
 
A less rigorous attempt to explore potential scale effects was implemented by examining the 
relationship between the estimated market power coefficients at the two-digit level and indicators 
11 Kee (2002) argues that equation will tend to zero because “… the shares of input in total revenue are mostly 
constant in the real world …” (p. 11). As it happens this is not true with our dataset but in any event there is no need 
to draw on such a stylised fact to motivate why (16) cannot be estimated given the argument made in the text.  
12 It would naturally be preferable to include a demand term as a scale variable but none would appear to be  
available at the four-digit manufacturing-industry level. 
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of scale such as the average numbers employed per local manufacturing unit in each sector13. 
This analysis could establish no systematic relationship. Typical of the kind of relationship that 
was revealed is given in Chart 2 for the case of the “Materials” input.  
 
Chart 2 
LAD Market Power Coefficients ("Materials") and Employment by  
Two-Digit Sector 
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13 We also used the level of gross output per local manufacturing unit in each sector but the findings were virtually 
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has applied Roeger’s version of Hall’s ingenious non-parametric test of market power 
to Irish manufacturing four-digit industries. The paper demonstrates the equivalence of so-called 
“monopoly” and “monopsony” versions of the test and suggests that tests of “market power” is a 
more neutral and acceptable term. The paper also proposes a simple test that is capable of 
discriminating between monopolistic and monopsonistic departures from competitive pricing. 
 
A number of the findings are worth noting. We find evidence of statistically significant market 
power in the pricing of key production inputs. We strongly reject the constancy of slopes at the 
two-digit sector level. Our results also suggest that the source of market power is most likely to 
arise in the pricing of inputs rather than outputs. This finding confirms the strong prior of 
pricing-taking behaviour in output markets which has been confirmed in several previous 
studies. 
 
We do, however, find evidence that our estimates of the degree of market power are affected to a 
significant extent by influential observations. While the statistical significance of the market-
power coefficients is not unduly affected by the employment of estimation approaches that take 
account of such observations, the magnitudes of the coefficients are affected mainly in a 
downward direction and especially for a handful of 2-digit sectors. 
 
While acknowledging the unsatisfactory nature of our attempt to allow for scale effects, we 
failed to uncover any strong evidence that our estimates of market power were contaminated by 
scale effects. This is an issue that merits further investigation. 
 
Based on the Least Absolute Distance estimator, our findings strongly suggest that Irish 
manufacturing industries, taken as a whole, exercise statistically significant market power, albeit 
to a modest extent, in purchases of “Materials” and “Industrial Employment”. In the case of 
“Materials” we report an overall market-power coefficient of about 0.2% and for “Industrial 
Employment” we find a value of about 0.5%.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
identical. 
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 These coefficients are evidently relatively modest in absolute size. For instance, it would ap
very improbable that the market-power coefficient for “Industrial Employment” would be 
sufficient in general to cause employment to increase in response to increases in the minimum 
wage. We wouldn’t be as confident in this expectation for the handful of sectors (“Food”, “W
and Wood Products”, “Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments”, “Motor Vehicles” and 
pear 
ood 
Other Transport Equipment”) where the market-power coefficient is much greater than 0.5%. 
Relative to 1999 outlays 
is would suggest an annual cost burden to industries of about €30 m.. 
d 
-
ower coefficients vary within those two-digit sectors that appear to have prominent values. 
 indeed 
hether the Authority should be unduly concerned at all by monopsony-type behaviour! 
 
                                                          
“
 
In many respects the most surprising result is the statistically significant and relatively large 
negative market-power coefficient that is obtained for “Services”14. For the full set of 
manufacturing industries, the coefficient implies that the price paid for this input is about 2.7% 
less than the internal marginal value of this input to the sector as whole. 
th
 
Our analysis allowed the market-power coefficients to vary across each two-digit sector. In 
respect of the “Materials” and “Industrial Employment” coefficients we find that a handful of 
sectors are highly influential in determining the overall coefficient for the full set of sectors. A 
greater consistency in the coefficient values across the 17 two-digit sectors is, however, reveale
for the “Services” input. It would seem to be worth examining the extent to which the market
p
 
A final thought is whether the orders of magnitude of departure from competitive input pricing 
that are uncovered in this paper should attract the interest of the Competition Authority or
w
14 The coefficient for “Other Employment” is also negative but it is statistically much less significant than 
“Services”, “Materials” or “Industrial Employment”. 
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